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BREAKING BAD LAW: METH LAB
INVESTIGATIONS HIGHLIGHT
ALASKA’S CURRENT APPROACH TO
PRIVACY
Victoria Sheets*
ABSTRACT
The right to privacy explicitly provided by the Alaska Constitution has long
been broadly interpreted—even protecting Alaskan citizens’ right to personal
home use and possession of marijuana. Though this right to privacy has been
interpreted many times over the last few decades, Alaska currently lacks a
coherent approach to application of its privacy laws. As the prevalence of
methamphetamine production increases in homes across Alaska, the Alaskan
courts’ approach to privacy must be reevaluated in light of its delicate
interaction with search and seizure policies surrounding methamphetamine
labs.

INTRODUCTION
Since the citizens of Alaska, with their strong emphasis on individual
liberty, enacted an amendment to the Alaska Constitution expressly
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States
Constitution, it can only be concluded that the right is broader in
scope than that of the Federal Constitution.1
This Note proposes that Alaskan courts should adopt a coherent,
purposeful approach to balancing Alaskans’ codified right to privacy
with the state’s interest in protecting its people. The key case examined
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1. Anchorage Police Dep’t Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24
P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001).
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here is Martin v. State.2 While exemplifying many aspects of Alaska’s
current approach to a citizen’s right to privacy, the case also provides a
framework within which competing approaches can be analyzed. This
Note is divided into four sections. Section I outlines the right to privacy
as provided in Alaska’s constitution and as interpreted by Alaskan case
law. Section II examines the extent of the state’s significant interest in
public health and safety, particularly the interests at stake in Martin.
Section III analyzes the reasoning and current approaches to privacy law
in Alaska, as well as how the existence of multiple approaches has
manifested in Martin. Finally, Section IV highlights how other states
have balanced the competing interests between privacy and promoting
public safety. From these considerations, this Note will explain why
Alaska’s current approach to balancing privacy and public safety
interest (as exemplified in Martin) is incoherent and suggest a few ways
in which Alaska’s courts could improve their approach going forward.
Unreasonable search and seizure laws cut to the core of the intricate
balance between a citizen’s right to privacy and the government’s duty
to protect its people. In March 2013, the Court of Appeals of Alaska
decided the latest in a series of cases on searches conducted in private
residences without a warrant or invitation. Martin v. State involved a
search by State Trooper Mike Ingram that resulted in the arrest of Gene
Martin and four others in their place of residence.3 Martin was tried and
subsequently convicted of second-degree misconduct involving a
controlled substance (specifically, the drugstore materials needed to
make methamphetamine).4 A security guard at a Wasilla shopping
center tipped off Trooper Ingram that Martin and four others “were
interested” in items often used to manufacture methamphetamine.5
Trooper Ingram followed the men from the shopping center to the
address in question—an apartment complex with five separate
residences connected by a walkway.6 To avoid detection by the men,
Trooper Ingram passed the residence before seeing which of the five
residences the men entered upon stopping at the apartment complex.7
After calling for back-up and waiting for about two hours in hopes that
some of the suspects would come out of whichever residence they had
previously entered, Trooper Ingram proceeded to walk onto a deck
surrounding the residences and “looked through the window of the first

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

297 P.3d 896 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 280 (2014).
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id.
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unit he came to.”8 Specifically, the officer was looking “through a crack
in the closed blinds” that was “an opening created by a broken piece of
blind.”9 It was then that Trooper Ingram saw items commonly used to
make methamphetamine within the home, and subsequently obtained a
search warrant based on what he saw through the blinds.10
The finding that Trooper Ingram was standing on a walkway that
was “impliedly open to the public” at the time of the search,11 a
technicality, stopped the Alaskan court from declaring a much-needed
comprehensive approach to search and seizure jurisprudence in Alaska.
In Martin, the Alaska Court of Appeals analyzed Trooper Ingram’s
search in two parts: (1) the approach of the trooper towards the window
and (2) the trooper’s looking through a broken piece in the closed
blinds.12 The court made a determination on the first part of the analysis,
and therefore did not reach the issue of whether the officer was
reasonable in looking through a crack in the closed blinds.13 By declaring
the walkway to be impliedly open to the public and stopping at the first
step of analysis, the court declined the opportunity to choose one of the
many approaches currently employed by the court, further
demonstrating the need to create a comprehensive approach to
balancing a right to privacy with the state’s interest in public safety.
According to Alaska law, without either a search warrant or an
invitation, law enforcement may only approach a residence if they are
“standing upon a part of [the] property that has been expressly or
impliedly opened to the public use.”14 Relying on this rule in Martin, the
appellate court affirmed the superior court’s finding that the deck was
impliedly open to the public when Trooper Ingram approached the
window to look inside.15 The reasons given by the superior court for
their finding had included the facts that Trooper Ingram “was not
engaged in some random fishing expedition,” and that he “reasonably
suspected” the group of men he had followed to be engaged in illegal
activity.16 Still, these reasons parallel the reasonable expectation of
privacy test that would have been employed in step two of the analysis.
Thus, under Martin, an Alaskan citizen—who may otherwise have had a
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 897–98.
11. Id. at 898.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 899–900 (explaining that because the court held that Trooper
Ingram’s vantage point was found to be “impliedly open to the public[,]” the
court could find that the officer’s looking through the blinds was lawful).
14. Pistro v. State, 590 P.2d 884, 886 (Alaska 1979).
15. Martin, 297 P.3d at 899.
16. Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy—may never have had that expectation
if the officer who infringes that expectation is deemed, in an ad hoc
determination by an Alaska court, to have reasonably suspected the
citizen of being engaged in illegal activity. Indeed, the situation in which
an officer suspects illegal activity may be the only time a reasonable
expectation of privacy would be at issue in the first place. But because
Trooper Ingram was standing on an impliedly public walkway, the
officer’s observation of chemicals through a crack in the drawn window
blinds was allowed to serve as the primary evidence in a showing of
probable cause used to subsequently obtain a search warrant for the
residence.17
The bifurcated analysis and novel result in Martin exemplify the
need for a comprehensive approach to the right to privacy throughout
the Alaskan court system. Situations like the one presented in Martin
will continue to arise. Accordingly, Alaska needs to adopt an approach
to reasonable searches that incorporates both the right to privacy
guaranteed by its state constitution and the growing need to protect its
people from the dangers of drug manufacturing.

I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.18
Affectionately referring to the rest of the United States as the ‘lower
forty-eight,’ Alaska has embraced its unique heritage since gaining
statehood.19 One of the many unique qualities of the Alaska government
comes in the form of the express right to privacy guaranteed by the
state’s constitution. Only ten states, including Alaska, expressly provide
for a right to privacy in their state constitution.20 Since Ravin v. State21 in
17. Id. at 897.
18. ALASKA CONST. art. 12, § 22.
19. Gaining statehood on January 3, 1959, Alaska is the most recent state to
be admitted to the United States apart from Hawaii (which gained statehood in
August of the same year). Alaska Statehood Act of 1959, Pub.L. 85-508, 72 Stat.
339, 339; Hawaii Statehood Admission Act of 1959, Pub.L. 86-3. See also Consent
to Act of Admission, ALASKA CONST. art. 12, § 13.
20. Other states that reiterate the Fourth Amendment, as well as expand
upon the general right to privacy, include Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. Privacy
Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 12,
2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx.
21. 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). In Ravin v. State, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the general right to privacy in article I, section 22 allowed for
personal possession and use of marijuana in the home. Id.
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1975, Alaska courts have created a robust jurisprudence surrounding the
right to privacy. These official expansions of the general right to privacy
echo the strong social mores of the Alaskan people—a long-existing
consensus that Alaskans want to be left alone in their independent
lifestyles by the government’s influence.22 As recognized by the Alaska
Supreme Court, “[o]ur territory and now state has traditionally been the
home of people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to
settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a measure of control
over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of
our sister states.”23
“[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general right
to privacy.”24 Instead, the issue of whether or not each citizen has a right
to privacy has been “left largely to the law of the individual [s]tates.”25
Alaska has addressed this issue directly by setting out a right to privacy
in its state constitution. Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution expressly
recognizes a “right of the people to privacy” that “shall not be
infringed.”26 Signaling the importance of this right, the Alaska Supreme
Court has since determined that the right to privacy is self-executing.27
The Alaska Constitution also provides that “all persons have a natural
right to life, liberty, [and] the pursuit of happiness.”28 In 1972, the same
year that Alaska’s Declaration of Rights was signed into law, the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the word “liberty” in article I, section 1
provided “total personal immunity from governmental control: the right
‘to be let alone.’”29 Even in the context of searches and seizures, the
Fourth Amendment and its interpretations do not limit the scope of this
right to privacy in the state of Alaska.30 Indeed, the Alaska
Constitution’s privacy provisions have continually been interpreted to
encompass a broader right to privacy than the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The Alaska Constitution’s right to
privacy was first interpreted as broader than the Fourth Amendment in
1975 by Ravin, and its expansive guarantee has been reiterated as

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
25. Id. at 351.
26. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
27. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 37–38 (Alaska 2001).
28. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
29. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972).
30. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 874–75 (Alaska 1978) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment and any federal decisions “should not be regarded as
determinative of the scope of Alaska’s right to privacy amendment, since no
such express right is contained in the United States Constitution”).
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recently as 2000.31
Not only does the right to privacy extend beyond the protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment,
but the express guarantee of privacy in article I, section 22 of the Alaska
Constitution has also been interpreted to be a “fundamental individual
right” by the Alaska Supreme Court.32 Originating as Senate Joint
Resolution No. 68, the right to privacy clause of the Alaska Constitution
was amended in the Senate and moved on to the House in June of
1972.33 Legislative revisions have provided powerful insight into the
interpretation of the legislative intent.34 For instance, the commentary of
the legislators has been found to support an extension of the right to
privacy beyond just informational privacy.35 The right to privacy
provisions have even supported the right of the mentally ill to refuse
antipsychotic medication in non-emergency situations.36 One of the
primary functions of the right to privacy guaranteed in the Alaska
Constitution, however, is specifically the protection against government
intrusion.37 The provisions cover searches by state actors, like police
officers and detectives.38 Another source of a right to privacy in the
Alaska Constitution comes in the form of article I, section 14, which
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

31. See State v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 379
(Alaska 2009) (striking down a one ounce limit on the possession of marijuana in
the home under the privacy ruling in Ravin v. State); Anchorage Police Dep’t
Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001)
(reiterating the heightened privacy interests in Alaska as compared to the
federal floor).
32. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P.3d 30, 36–38.
33. ALASKA S. JOURNAL, 7th Leg., 1st Sess. 1150, 1173 (June 6–7, 1972);
ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 7th Leg., 1st Sess. 1478–79 (June 5, 1972).
34. See Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d at 36–38 (looking to the legislative history
of article I, section 22 in support of the self-executing nature of the right to
privacy in the Alaska Constitution).
35. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 n.10
(Alaska 1997).
36. See Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 254 (Alaska 2006)
(relying on the “Alaska Constitution’s guarantees of liberty and privacy” to hold
that “in future non-emergency cases a court may not permit a treatment facility
to administer psychotropic drugs” without consent or proof by “clear and
convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is in the patient’s best
interests”).
37. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Alaska
1989) (declining to extend the right to privacy to private actions).
38. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881–82 (Alaska 1978) (affirming the
correct application of article I, section 22 in suppression of testimony acquired
through electronic monitoring because “Alaska’s Constitution mandates that its
people be free from invasions of privacy by means of surreptitious monitoring of
conversations”).
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houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”39 The Alaska Supreme
Court has further provided that “[t]he primary purpose of these
constitutional provisions is the protection of personal privacy and
dignity against unwarranted intrusions by the State.”40
The right to privacy guaranteed in the Alaska Constitution has
been uniquely applied in the context of drug possession. In 1975, Alaska
became the first state to enact a statute declaring that a ban on the
possession and personal use of marijuana was unconstitutional based on
the statute’s impermissible infringement on the citizens’ right to
privacy.41 The court held that the right to privacy guaranteed under
article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution “encompass[es] the
possession and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely
personal, non-commercial context in the home.”42
The right to privacy in Alaska, as in the federal jurisdiction, has
been especially recognized in the home. The express right to privacy in
article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution was added with the
deliberate purpose of codifying the concentration of privacy in the home
of each Alaska resident.43 The fact that Trooper Ingram’s search
uncovered conduct within the home makes the failure to apply the right
to privacy in Martin especially troubling. The Alaska Supreme Court
“has consistently recognized that the home is constitutionally protected
from unreasonable searches and seizures, reasoning that the home itself
retains a protected status under the Fourth Amendment and Alaska’s
constitution distinct from that of the occupant’s person.”44 However,
part of the court’s reasoning in Ravin turned on the fact that the state
could not show “any harm to the user or others from the private,
personal use of marijuana.”45 Where the production or use of
methamphetamines is the conduct in question, the government will

39. See Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148
(Alaska 1977) (quoting Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 506 (Alaska 1967)) (referring
to article I, section 14’s guarantees against unreasonable search and seizures by
the state).
40. Weltz, 431 P.2d at 506 (internal quotations omitted).
41. See Bruce Brashear, Marijuana Prohibition and the Constitutional Right of
Privacy: An Examination of Ravin v. State, 11 TULSA L. J. 563, 565 (1975)
(explaining that before the Alaska Supreme Court decided Ravin, “no court had
declared a statute outlawing the possession and use of marijuana
unconstitutional” based on a right to privacy).
42. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
43. See id. at 503–04 (“The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution
was intended to give recognition and protection to the home.”).
44. Id. at 503.
45. Id. at 501.
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presumably have an easier time establishing harm to the user and
others.46 The court in Ravin was careful to add that “[n]o one has an
absolute right to do things in the privacy of his own home which will
affect himself or others adversely.”47 However, the government “cannot
simply decide what is in a person’s best interest and compel it.”48 The
right to privacy is definitely present to some extent in the home, but
whether or not the public interest served in Martin should outweigh that
privacy interest is an issue that needs to be addressed directly.
In sum, the express right to privacy guaranteed by the Alaska
Constitution in article I, sections 14 and 22 has been interpreted to
“serv[e] its core purpose as a ‘restraining force against the abuse of
governmental power.’”49 This express right to privacy has infamously
pioneered a right to the possession and personal use of recreational
drugs in the home.50 If the state’s search of the suspects’ home in Martin
can be defended as an exception to this robust right to privacy, the state
will have to provide compelling evidence that it “can meet its
substantial burden” in showing that its actions were in furtherance of a
legitimate state interest.51

II. THE STATE’S INTEREST
The state has long been empowered to enforce regulations in the
interest of public safety.52 In direct opposition to the strong right to
privacy established in Section I, the state of Alaska also faces a growing
threat to public safety from methamphetamine consumption and
production. The state’s interest in curtailing this conduct, which often
takes place in the privacy of individual residences, is an equally
important factor in Alaska’s establishment of an appropriate approach
to the protection from unreasonable searches and seizures by the state. It
is unclear whether heavy emphasis on the Alaska Constitution’s right to
privacy should prevail over narcotic use now, as it did over marijuana
use in 1975.53
First of all, this is a recent problem. Therefore, Alaska Supreme
46. See infra Section II.
47. 537 P.2d at 504.
48. Id. at 509.
49. State v. Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d 30, 38 n.50 (Alaska 2001) (quoting
United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Alaska 1967)).
50. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
51. Id.
52. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2681 (2011) (holding that
the state’s legitimate interest in promoting public health “falls within the
traditional scope of a State’s police power”).
53. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
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Court precedent on personal drug possession and use within the home
is developing. The prevalence of narcotic manufacturing as well as
abuse has increased dramatically in recent years nationwide.54
Specifically, thirty-six methamphetamine labs have been seized in
Alaska in the last five years alone.55 In addition to the potential for
bodily harm, manufacturing operations damage property, often beyond
repair.56 Drug use is also a concern for public safety as it may facilitate
further crimes by citizens who are under the influence. According to the
Alaska Department of Public Safety, between thirty-seven and fortyseven percent of all cases initiated by Alaska State Troopers involved
either drugs or alcohol.57 Alaska currently deploys seven investigative
task forces specifically to deal with the state’s drug problem.58
The fact that the state’s compelling interest in identifying and
curtailing drug abuse and manufacture was driving the analysis of the
Martin case bears on how the right to privacy might be limited in that
context. In the context of drug abuse prevention, the right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizures has been interpreted narrowly
by the Supreme Court of the United States. For instance, in Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomi County v.
Earls, the Supreme Court held that random drug testing of students that

54. See 2013 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, U.S., DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. 10 (Nov. 2013) http://www.dea.gov/resourcecenter/DIR-017-13%20NDTA%20Summary%20final.pdf
(stating
that
as
methamphetamine prices have decreased nationwide 70 percent from 2007 to
2012, the purity of the drug has also increased almost 130 percent). This project
was taken over by the Department of Justice in 2012. Id. at iii. The 2013 National
Drug Threat Assessment factors were provided by 1,307 state and local law
enforcement agencies through the 2013 National Drug Threat Survey. Id. at iv.
55. Alaska State Troopers, 2013 Annual Drug Report, ALASKA BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION STATEWIDE DRUG ENF’T UNIT 21 http://www.dps.state.ak.us/
AST/ABI/docs/SDEUreports/2013%20Annual%20Drug%20Report.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2015).
56. ALASKA DEP’T OF ENVIRON. CONSERVATION, Illegal Drug Manufacturing
Sites, http://dec.alaska.gov/spar/perp/methlab/methlab_listing.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2014) (listing illegal drug manufacturing site records kept by
Department of Environmental Conservation as required by 46.03.550(b) of the
Alaska Statutes).
57. Div. Statewide Drug Enf’t Unit, DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
http://dps.alaska.gov/AST/ABI/SDEU.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
58. Alaska State Troopers, 2013 Annual Drug Report, ALASKA BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION STATEWIDE DRUG ENF’T UNIT 4 http://www.dps.state.ak.us/AST/
ABI/docs/SDEUreports/2013%20Annual%20Drug%20Report.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2015). The seven task forces are the Alaska Interdiction Task
Force/Anchorage Enforcement Group (DEA sponsored), Fairbanks Area-wide
Narcotics Team, Mat-Su Narcotics Enforcement Team, South Central Area-wide
Narcotics Team, Southeast Alaska Cities Against Drugs Task Force, Western
Alaska Alcohol and Narcotics Team, Special Crimes Investigation Unit.
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participated in extracurricular activities, even without suspicion, did not
violate the students’ Fourth Amendment rights.59 Despite the express
right to privacy found in the Alaska Constitution, the Court’s holding in
Earls echoed the stance already taken in the year prior by the Alaska
Supreme Court.60 As noted in Section I, the state of Alaska has a unique
history in its treatment of drug use and the right to privacy.61 Arguably,
Alaska’s more liberal view of personal drug use is due in part to the
Alaska Supreme Court’s view on what constitutes a state’s interest in
preventing harm to its citizens. After analyzing several approaches, the
court in Ravin affirmed a “general proposition that the authority of the
state to exert control over the individual extends only to activities of the
individual which affect others or the public at large.”62 Although the
right to privacy and freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle is not
absolute, the court only allows the right to be curtailed where “it begins
to infringe on the rights and welfare of others.”63
Because of the tenets embraced by the Alaska Supreme Court, the
main analysis of public safety and its balance with a citizen’s right to
privacy focuses on the harm done to others in the society. In allowing
the right to privacy to cover personal use of marijuana in the home, the
Alaska Supreme Court emphasized marijuana’s effects of “passivity and
inactivity” on the mind and body.64 This allowed the court to discount
the public harm that might be caused by getting high and driving—a
phenomenon seen as the most common way marijuana use could harm
others.65
In
contrast
to
marijuana’s
mellowing
effects,
methamphetamines often produce physical effects like “increased
wakefulness, increased physical activity . . . increased respiration, [and]
rapid heart rate” while at the same time producing “reduced motor
skills” and “anxiety, confusion, insomnia, and mood disturbances” as
well as “violent behavior.”66 Therefore, the evidence cited in Ravin,
making the harm caused by marijuana seem less likely to affect people

59. See 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (“A student’s privacy interest is limited in a
public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining
discipline, health, and safety.”).
60. See Alaska Police Dep’t Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24
P.3d 547, 557 (Alaska 2001) (approving suspicionless drug testing for some
police officers and firefighters).
61. See supra Section I.
62. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 509 (Alaska 1975).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 510–11.
65. Id. at 511.
66. DrugFacts: Methamphetamine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NAT’L
INST.
ON
DRUG
ABUSE,
1–2
(Jan.
2014),
https://
d14rmgtrwzf5a.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/drugfacts_meth.pdf.
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other than the user himself, is unavailing in the context of
methamphetamines.
Another aspect of drug use absent with marijuana in Ravin, but
present with methamphetamines in Martin, is the commercial use of
methamphetamine precursors. The Alaska Supreme Court made it very
clear that the right to privacy only encompassed the possession and use
“in a purely personal, non-commercial context in the home.”67 The court
makes a comparison between its treatment of marijuana use and the
Supreme Court’s treatment of obscenity in the home.68 The “distinction
between commercial distribution of obscene matter and the private
enjoyment of it at home” was incorporated into the right to privacy
analysis of the use of illicit substances in the home.69 The fact that the
suspects in Martin were suspected of buying the materials necessary for
the manufacture of methamphetamines, presumably commercial rather
than merely personal use of the drugs, cuts against the right to privacy
from Trooper Ingram’s search in the Martin case.
Despite the dangers and societal costs of methamphetamine use,
the state’s interest in public safety must still be balanced with the
express right to privacy in Alaska. After all, the court did not make its
ruling in Ravin in absence of serious doubts about the safety of
marijuana. The Alaska Supreme Court emphasized that the ruling did
“not mean to condone the use of marijuana.”70 Instead, the court found
that the right to privacy in Alaska’s Constitution outweighed the
opinion of the experts involved that were “unanimously opposed to the
use of any psychoactive drugs.”71 This makes it less clear that the danger
of methamphetamine to users is enough to outweigh the privacy
concerns raised by the search in Martin. However, even in 1975, the
court noted the increased danger of other drugs that “result in numbers
of people becoming public charges” or “widespread use of [a] drug
[that] could significantly debilitate the fabric of our society” as possibly
necessitating state interference in the future.72

67. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504.
68. See id. at 499 (discussing the Supreme Court’s development and
refinement of case law on First and Fourteenth Amendment protections
applicable to obscene materials).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 511.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 509–10 (comparing marijuana use with “far more dangerous effects
of alcohol, barbiturates, and amphetamines”).
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III. CURRENT APPROACHES
The Martin case embodies the collision of two strong legal
footholds. On one hand, the state has a strong, clear interest in
protecting its citizens and societal fabric from methamphetamine use
and manufacture. On the other hand, each citizen has a right to privacy
expressly provided for in the Alaska Constitution—a right that is most
acute in the home.
Despite the right to privacy’s classification as a fundamental right,
the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized some limitations on the right
due to public policy considerations. In Ravin, the court cautioned that
even within the home, “the right of privacy in the sense of immunity
from prosecution is absolute only when the private activity will not
endanger or harm the general public.”73 However, as the majority held in
Ravin, the right to privacy does “encompass the possession and
ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely personal, noncommercial context in the home.”74 In Alaska, the government can only
prosecute these types of activities in the home if “the state can meet its
substantial burden” by showing that the prevention or regulation of the
activity in question achieves “a legitimate state interest.”75 In Martin, the
court failed to establish the legitimate state interest that supports waiver
of the privacy considerations traditionally given to activities (even drug
related activities) within the home. Though, as stated in Section II of this
Note, the state may have a substantially more legitimate state interest in
regulating the home manufacture of methamphetamine than personal
marijuana use,76 the Martin decision makes no argument on these
grounds. Instead, the court relies solely on the implied openness to the
public of the walkway upon which Trooper Ingram stood.
By deciding Martin on the basis of whether the walkway upon
which Trooper Ingram stood was open to the public, the court robbed
itself of an opportunity to face the balancing issue head on. This
theoretical punt of addressing two competing interests in Martin,
privacy and public safety, is the latest example of the current scattered
approach to privacy law in Alaska.

73. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 504.
75. Id.
76. This assumes that the state interest would be in the societal effects of
methamphetamine production and use, rather than a purely paternalistic
motive.

ARTICLE 5 - SHEETS (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

12/3/2015 9:36 AM

ALASKA’S CURRENT APPROACH TO PRIVACY

385

A. Current Theoretical Approaches to the Right to Privacy in Alaska
Since the court’s interpretation of the express right to privacy in
Ravin, several different approaches to the right to privacy have emerged,
cluttering Alaska’s privacy jurisprudence.77 Three separate approaches
have been identified in Alaska’s privacy law, each applied in different
fact-specific scenarios. The first two approaches, the “compelling state
interest” test and the “sliding scale” approach, both require a
justification based on how closely tailored the state action is to the state
interest. The third approach, distinct from the first two tailoring
approaches, is the reasonable expectation test. The Alaska Supreme
Court has employed all three of these approaches at various times.
However, Alaska’s privacy jurisprudence would benefit from a more
consistent and comprehensive approach.
The “compelling state interest” test was first put forth in Gray v.
State.78 This test requires a state to justify any infringement upon a
fundamental right as necessary in furtherance of a compelling state
interest.79 Gray also found the right to privacy to encompass the right to
ingest “food, beverages or other substances.”80 A version of this test was
used in Ravin—albeit without mention of a fundamental right to smoke
marijuana—to find that the state’s interest was not compelling enough,
allowing for the personal use of marijuana under the privacy clause.81
Secondly, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted a “sliding scale”
approach82 to assess the right to privacy in State v. Erickson.83 In an
approach almost indistinguishable from the compelling state interest
test, the sliding scale approach entails balancing the fundamental right
to privacy infringed upon and the closeness of the relationship of the
government action to the legitimate state interest served.84 The Alaska
Supreme Court explicitly declined to use the same compelling state
interest terminology and test that was used in Ravin, but continued to
77. See John F. Grossbauer, Alaska’s Right to Privacy Ten Years After Ravin v.
State: Developing a Jurisprudence of Privacy, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 159, 160 (1985) (“The
court’s failure to develop an independent analytical approach to the privacy
issue has resulted in inconsistent treatment of the right in the variety of contexts
in which the amendment has been invoked.”).
78. 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974).
79. Id. at 527.
80. Id. at 528.
81. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975).
82. Grossbauer, supra note 77.
83. 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
84. See id. at 22 (“We find that there is a sufficiently close and substantial
relationship between the means chosen to regulate cocaine and the legislative
purpose of preventing harm to health and welfare so as to justify the prohibition
of use of cocaine.”).
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analyze the possible privacy infringement under a tailoring approach
using different terminology.85 Despite the similarities of the compelling
state interest test and the sliding scale approach,86 the sliding scale
approach in Erickson allowed the government interest in public safety to
outweigh the privacy interest in using cocaine in the home—in stark
contrast to the outcome of the compelling state interest test analysis in
Ravin.87
Yet another approach to the Alaskan right to privacy, distinct in
terminology and analysis from these first two tests, has been adopted as
a reflection of the federal measures against unreasonable search and
seizure—whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy
at the time and place of the search.88 Another point of the privacy
analysis in Martin, as well as in many search and seizure cases, is
whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time and
place of the search.89 In his concurrence in Katz v. United States,90 Justice
Harlan set forth the two-prong test for finding that there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy.91 First, the person must have an
actual subjective expectation of privacy; secondly, the expectation must
be recognized as reasonable by society.92 After laying out the test, Justice
Harlan specifically applied the two-prong approach to the home, finding
that the home is typically a place where privacy is reasonably
expected.93 The state of Alaska has explicitly and continuously adopted
Justice Harlan’s articulation of this two-prong approach in assessing
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.94
Alaska’s continual use of all three of these approaches has led to

85. See id. at 11–12.
86. Both tests are different versions of a tailoring test with different
terminology denoting a similar analysis. The compelling state interest test
requires necessity to meet a compelling state interest, while the sliding scale
approach requires a closeness of the relationship to a legitimate state interest.
This is another indication of the lack of structure in approaches to a right to
privacy.
87. Erickson, 574 P.2d at 18.
88. See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875 (Alaska 1978) (adopting the
reasonable expectation of privacy test).
89. Martin v. State, 297 P.3d 896, 899 (Alaska 2013).
90. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
91. Id. at 361.
92. Id.
93. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a
place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention
to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”) (internal quotations omitted).
94. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 797 (Alaska 1973). See, e.g., Anderson v.
State, 555 P.2d 251, 260–61 (Alaska 1976); Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456, 458
(Alaska 1976); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138, 149 (Alaska 1977).
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scattered jurisprudence and seemingly case-by-case determination of
whether or not the right to privacy protects an individual’s conduct. For
instance, in Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,95 the Alaska Supreme
Court found that although Ravin still allowed the personal use of
marijuana to be covered by the right to privacy, employees “could not
maintain an action for invasion of privacy with regard to . . . urinalysis”
conducted by their employer that was designed to detect personal use of
marijuana.96 The rationale for allowing the infringement on the
employees’ right to privacy in Luedtke was in large part that the personal
use of marijuana could endanger others because “work on an oil rig can
be very dangerous.”97 Yet, in Sampson v. State,98 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the right to privacy did not allow for physician-assisted
suicide of the terminally ill—despite the lack of evidence that the act
involves any genuine harm to others.99
One explanation for the current approach is that, while the
decisions may seem chaotic, there is actually an underlying pattern. The
phenomenon of “equilibrium-adjustment” has been proposed to explain
similar case-by-case analysis in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.100
The basic principle of equilibrium-adjustment is characterized as
maintaining the status quo such that “[w]hen new tools and new
practices threaten to expand or contract police power in a significant
way, courts adjust the level of Fourth Amendment protection to try to
restore the prior equilibrium.”101 However, several Fourth Amendment
laws have remained relatively stable since their inception.102 This
includes the rule that in order “[t]o search a home, the police ordinarily
must have a warrant.”103 This theory can be triggered when there are
“new crimes and new ways in which crimes are committed and
investigated.”104
In
Martin,
the
home
manufacture
of
methamphetamines was a fairly new criminal act and social
phenomenon. Methamphetamine was not invented until 1919 in Japan,

95. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
96. Id. at 1138.
97. See id. at 1136 (“It is extremely important that the driller be drug free in
the performance of his tasks in order to insure the immediate safety of the other
personnel on the particular drill rig.”).
98. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
99. Id. at 98.
100. See Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of The Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (explaining equilibrium-adjustment
theory in defense of a seemingly scattered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
101. Id. at 480.
102. Id. at 484–85.
103. Id. at 484.
104. Id. at 489.
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and was not outlawed until 1970 by the Controlled Substances Act.105
The current method of cooking methamphetamines at home did not
appear until the 1990s, and the precursors that are sold in drugstores
were not regulated until 1996.106 Under the equilibrium-adjustment
theory, this new crime might cause the search and seizure analysis to
adjust to account for the change. However, even if there is some element
of subconscious order through the equilibrium-adjustment theory,
driven in Martin by the relatively new crime of methamphetamine
production, Alaska still needs to express the approach in a coherent
manner so that it can be applied with clarity and regularity going
forward.
B. Consequences of the Current, Non-cohesive Approach in Martin
Under the court’s reasoning in Martin, an officer could walk up to
any house and peek through a narrow crack between curtains that have
been deliberately drawn, just to see if they observe anything
incriminating. The court claims that the officer “was not engaged in
some random fishing expedition” because he had been tipped off that
the men had purchased precursors used in the production of
methamphetamine.107 But the record shows that Trooper Ingram
actually walked up on the deck, up to the house, and looked in the
window without knowing if the suspects had gone into that residence at all.108
The officer stated that he lost sight of the suspects after driving past the
entrance of the complex to maintain his undercover status. In doing so,
“he did not see which of the five units the suspects entered.”109 Then he
called for backup, and waited outside “hoping that one or more of the
four suspects would emerge” from one of the five residences in the
complex.110 At that point, the officers did not know which residence
housed the suspects. This is apparent because of Trooper Ingram’s
testimony that he walked up and “looked through the window of the
first unit he came to.”111 Luckily for the state (and quite unluckily for the
suspects) that first unit happened to be housing precursors to the
controlled substances. However, the link in the inference chain the
officers were working with had been broken before they peered into the

105. A Brief History of Methamphetamine, VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH (2015),
http://healthvermont.gov/adap/meth/brief_history.aspx.
106. Id.
107. Martin v. State, 297 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
108. Id. at 897.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.

ARTICLE 5 - SHEETS (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

12/3/2015 9:36 AM

ALASKA’S CURRENT APPROACH TO PRIVACY

389

window. If the first unit had housed a different set of four men who
were lining up cocaine to snort, could Trooper Ingram have entered
based on what he saw through a crack in their window blinds? Though
he was looking for a particular set of suspects, and even if we stipulate
the debatable point that the walkway was impliedly public space, the
Martin approach still allows an officer to look through a hole in anyone’s
blinds, so long as they live near a followed suspect.
Furthermore, instead of providing probable cause and obtaining a
search warrant to search the residence, Trooper Ingram’s search itself,
through the window, provided the probable cause that then allowed the
officers to obtain a warrant and seize the evidence. Not only is this
circular logic alarming, it also flies in the face of Alaska law. The Alaska
Supreme Court has deliberately continued to use the two-prong AguilarSpinelli test for probable cause.112 In 1983, the federal law became a twoprong test that allowed probable cause to be a fluid concept, with one
prong being able to make up for a lack of reliability in the other, so as
not to impede police work in the field by giving de novo review to
magistrate judges.113 However, the Alaska Supreme Court chose to keep
the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test because of the heightened right to
privacy established under Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska
Constitution.114 This bears on the analysis of the Martin decision in that
the express right to privacy has been purposefully interpreted to
heighten the burden on police investigations. There is far less weight
given in Alaska to an argument that the practical impediments to
obtaining evidence against suspects should allow the right to privacy to
be infringed upon.
Because the Alaska Supreme Court employs these tests
intermittently and in different fact-specific scenarios, the practical effect
is a type of ex post, case-by-case analysis of an individual’s right to
privacy when it is competing with an action in furtherance of a state
interest. Therefore, there is little predictability as to what is considered
protected by a right to privacy and what is not. The facts of Martin
demonstrate the necessity of a coherent approach to the right to privacy
in Alaska.

112. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322 (Alaska 1985) (maintaining a more
stringent approach for probable cause found by a magistrate after the Supreme
Court of the United States adopted a totality of the circumstances approach to
establishing probable cause).
113. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232–36 (1983) (adopting a less stringent
test for determining probable cause for search warrants and citing, among other
things, consideration for hindrance of police investigations).
114. Jones, 706 P.2d at 321–22.
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IV. POTENTIAL APPROACHES
Though the Alaska Supreme Court somewhat dodged the question
of whether the search invaded the reasonable expectation of privacy in
Martin, Alaska needs to adopt a more comprehensive approach to
balancing the privacy interests of individuals with the government’s
interest in public safety. This Section lists several different approaches
employed by others states through both their common law decisions
and legislative enactments. It is important to remember that, in addition
to decisions by the Alaska Supreme Court, the “legislative body is well
situated . . . to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive
way.”115 Whether through the legislature or the court system, Alaska
must choose an approach to the balance between privacy and protection
that honors both the Alaska Constitution’s express guarantees of privacy
as well as the growing dangers to public safety.
A. Developing an Independent Right to Privacy Jurisprudence
Not all states that have separate codification of a right to privacy or
a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in their state
constitutions have taken on the challenge of developing their own body
of privacy law. Some states have instead decided to use a “lockstep”
approach—keeping the privacy rights guaranteed by their state
constitution in deliberate congruence with the case law of the Supreme
Court of the United States surrounding the Fourth Amendment.116 Other
states’ high courts have embraced their chance to interpret the state’s
constitutional provisions independent of any Supreme Court precedent
on similar issues—and they often feel the need to express their reasons
for doing so. The Supreme Court of Iowa did just this in their decision
State v. Ochoa.117 In fact, over half of the state supreme courts have
recognized heightened protections of their citizens’ rights of freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures under their own state
constitutions rather than under the Fourth Amendment.118 As discussed

115. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
116. See People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 46 (Ill. 2006) (holding that “the
search and seizure clause [in the state constitution] “as construed under our
limited lockstep approach, strikes the proper balance between protecting the
people from unreasonable intrusion by the state and providing the people with
effective law enforcement”).
117. See 792 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010) (“Although many state
constitutions have search and seizure language that is virtually identical to the
Fourth Amendment, the movement toward independent state constitutional
adjudication has had dramatic impact on the law of search and seizure.”).
118. See Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS.
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in Section III, the Alaska Supreme Court has affirmatively taken on the
task of developing an independent approach to analyzing the protection
of rights afforded its citizens under the Alaska Constitution, although it
has yet to nail down a comprehensive approach.119
B. Limiting the Scope of Places Protected
Some states have struck the balance between the government’s
interest in public safety and the individual right to privacy by limiting
the scope of places where a reasonable expectation of privacy can exist.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has interpreted the state constitutional
right to privacy to protect a physical “zone of privacy.”120 The lower
standard of reasonableness of the state’s intrusion is counterbalanced by
the physical zone inside which the individual’s right is protected. This
approach not only uses physical places to limit the scope of where a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, but also can be limited by
which tools are used to convey private information. The Supreme Court
of Montana adopted a version of this approach in State v. Allen.121 Other
states have specifically rejected the physical limitations approach to the
right to privacy analysis. For instance, in Hamberger v. Eastman,122 the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that the actions forbidden due
to a right to privacy are “not limited to a physical invasion of his home
or his room or his quarters,” but also extend to wiretapping and
eavesdropping depending on the content of the conversation.123
The Alaska Supreme Court has not used the physical limitations
approach as an effective tool to balance privacy and public safety
interests. Still, the court has identified some physical limitations of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. For instance, the Alaska Supreme
Court has held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy
where a suspect was voluntarily inside a police station, despite the fact
that the note in question was partially hidden on the suspect’s person
when seized.124

L. J. 417, 418–64 (2007) (stating the test that each state uses).
119. See supra, Section III.
120. See Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 329–30 (Ill. 2006) (applying the Illinois
approach that “the state’s intrusion into the individual’s bodily zone of privacy
must be reasonable”).
121. See 241 P.3d 1045, 1061 (Mont. 2010) (holding that conversations held
over an individual’s cell phone will be recognized as areas in which a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists, even when that conversation is recorded “at the
behest of law enforcement”).
122. 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
123. Id. at 241–42.
124. Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502, 505–06 (Alaska 1967).
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C. Adjusting the Burden of Proof Needed to Conduct a Search
Several states have balanced privacy concerns with the state’s
interest in public safety by adjusting the amount of suspicion needed for
officers to conduct a search. Denoting a standard for the showing the
government must make before conducting a search is one way that the
state can balance individual privacy interests against public safety
considerations. For instance, in Jardines v. State,125 the Florida Supreme
Court held that the higher burden of probable cause, not merely
reasonable suspicion, was required to allow a search at a private
residence.126 This effectively allowed the state to search within a private
area as long as a heightened burden of proof was met—creating a
balance of privacy interests and public safety interests.
The state of Alaska has not taken advantage of this mode of
protection for the right to privacy either. In 2009, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that a search based on an officer’s reasonable suspicion, with
no probable cause, did not violate the individual’s right to privacy, nor
did it constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Alaska
Constitution.127 The court in Martin supported Trooper Ingram’s actions
of looking inside the residence, through closed blinds, based on the fact
that he “reasonably suspected that the group of people he had followed to
the residence had just brought drug manufacturing supplies into one of
the units.”128 The use of the evidence Trooper Ingram saw only by taking
the action of looking through the window, based on reasonable
suspicion, was key to establishing the probable cause that then allowed
the officers on the scene to obtain a warrant.129 Setting the bar as low as
reasonable suspicion for evidentiary support of Trooper Ingram’s initial
search does little to balance privacy interests with the needs of a police
investigation in Alaska.

125. 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011)
126. See id. at 37 (holding that “probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, is
the proper evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must make
under the Fourth Amendment prior to conducting a dog ‘sniff test’ at a private
residence”).
127. See Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 337 (Alaska 2009) (holding that an
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the defendant was manufacturing
methamphetamine outweighed the defendant’s privacy interests in his street
side garbage).
128. Martin v. State, 297 P.3d 896, 900 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013).
129. See id. at 897 (“This search warrant, in turn, was based in large measure
on the testimony of a state trooper who walked up to the residence, looked
through a narrow opening in the window blinds, and observed a number of
supplies that are commonly used for making methamphetamine.”).
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CONCLUSION
Alaska must find a way to balance the competing privacy interests
of its individual citizens and the public safety interests of the state.
Unlike the current, unpredictable approach, the Alaska courts need to
deal with this delicate balance without both restricting the scope of a
reasonable expectation of privacy and requiring only a showing of
reasonable suspicion for an officer to effectively search a private
residence from an impliedly public walkway. Instead, the Alaska
Supreme Court should choose one limitation or the other to allow for
searches and seizures in the interest of public safety, and without
infringing upon the explicit fundamental rights to privacy guaranteed in
the Alaska Constitution.
The current scheme allowing for decisions like Martin v. State—
where an officer’s effective search inside an individual’s residence was
allowed to serve as evidence for probable cause to obtain a search
warrant and arrest the occupants of the residence—is not striking an
adequate balance of the competing interests at stake. The Alaska
Supreme Court went so far in Martin as to “concede that many
reasonable people might find it distasteful to have police officers
approach residential windows and peer through gaps in the curtains or
blinds.”130 The adoption of a more comprehensive approach, one that
hopefully yields results that reasonable people will not find as
distasteful as that in Martin, will allow for stability in future decisions in
Alaska privacy law jurisprudence as well as predictability in which
actions will be protected under the right to privacy and why they may
be protected.

130. Id. at 899.

